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PREFACE 
T h i s  p a p e r  was m o t i v a t e d  by an  e a r l y  1986 e x p r e s s i o n  o f  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  
r e c e n t  problems and f a i l u r e s  o f  f l i g h t  p y r o t e c h n i c  ha rdware  by Norman R.  
S c h u l z e ,  NASA H e a d q u a r t e r s ,  t h e n  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  Ch ie f  E n g i n e e r ,  a n d  now O f f i c e  
of  S a f e t y ,  R e l i a b i l i t y ,  M a i n t a i n a b i l i t y  and  Q u a l i t y  Assurance .  The L a n g l e y  
Resea rch  C e n t e r  (LaRC) was r e q u e s t e d  to  t a k e  t h e  l e a d  r o l e  i n  c o m p i l i n g  a n  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h i s  problem and t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  f i e l d  o f  p y r o t e c h n i c  t e c h n o l o g y .  The emphas i s  on t h i s  
e f f o r t  is s u b s t a n t i a t e d  by t h e  o v e r a l l  a s sumpt ion  i n  t h e  d e s i g n  community t h a t  
p y r o t e c h n i c s  are s i m p l e ,  w e l l - d e f i n e d  and t h o r o u g h l y  u n d e r s t o o d  d e v i c e s  t o  
which w e  r o u t i n e l y  e n t r u s t  m i s s i o n - c r i t i c a l  as w e l l  as s a f e t y - o f - f l i g h t  func-  
t i o n s .  The f i r s t  a c t i o n  was a  May 15, 1986, NASA/DOD s u r v e y  from Lang ley  
e n t i t l e d ,  " S o l i c i t a t i o n  o f  I n t e r e s t  i n  a C o o r d i n a t e d  P y r o t e c h n i c  Technology 
E f f o r t  Among C e n t e r s . "  Two m e e t i n g s  f o l l o w e d ,  o n e  on November 13 a n d  14, 
1986, a t  t h e  NASA Langley  Resea rch  C e n t e r ,  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  on A p r i l  29 a n d  30, 
1987, a t  t h e  NASA Johnson Space  C e n t e r ,  w i t h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from e a c h  NASA 
C e n t e r ,  t h e  A i r  F o r c e  Space  D i v i s i o n ,  and  t h e  Naval  S u r f a c e  War fa re  C e n t e r .  
These  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e  now t h e  n u c l e u s  o f  t h e  NASA/DOD Aerospace  
P y r o t e c h n i c  Sys tems S t e e r i n g  Committee,  whose o b j e c t i v e  is to p r o v i d e  t h e  NASA 
and  DOD w i t h  a  p o l i c y  and p o s t u r e  which w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  s a f e t y ,  pe r fo rmance ,  
q u a l i t y  and  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  a e r o s p a c e  p y r o t e c h n i c  sys t ems .  
The NASA/DOD Aerospace  P y r o t e c h n i c  Sys tems S t e e r i n g  Committee h a s  been  
t h e  p r i m a r y  s o u r c e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  c o m p i l a t i o n  o f  f a i l u r e s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
t h i s  p a p e r ,  and  t h e  members have  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  d a t a  a n a l y s i s  and  f i n a l  
r e v i e w  o f  t h i s  r e p o r t .  The t h o r o u g h n e s s  and  t r a c e a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e s  
p r e s e n t e d  h e r e i n  a r e  n o t  germaine  t o  t h i s  s t u d y ,  s i n c e  o n l y  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  
p y r o t e c h n i c  problems w a s  sough t .  
SUMMARY 
Althoucjh p y r o t e c h n i c s  have  s u c c e s s f u l l y  s e r v e d  a c r i t i c a l  role i n  
accomnplishing s p a c e c r a f t  mechan ica l  f u n c t i o n s ,  f a i l u r e s  c o n t i n u e  t o  o c c u r .  
Recen t  o c c u r r e n c e s  prompted Norman R. Schu lze ,  NASA H e a d q u a r t e r s ,  t o  i n i t i a t e  a  
s u r v e y  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  and  c a u s e .  T h i s  p a p e r  d e s c r i b e s  a s u r v e y  
c:ompiLed f o r  a  23-year p e r i o d  which i n c l u d e s  84  s e r i o u s  component or sys t em 
l d i l u r e s ,  12 o c c u r r e d  i n  f l i g h t ,  w i t h  f u l l y  d e v e l o p e d  and q u a l i f i e d  hardware .  
Ana lyses  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  as t o  when and  where t h e s e  f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d ,  t h e i r  
t e c h n i c a l  s o u r c e  o r  c a u s e ,  f o l l o w e d  by t h e  r e a s o n s  why and how t h e s e  k i n d s  o f  
f a i l u r e s  c o n t i n u e  t o  o c c u r .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  f r e q u e n t l y  i n d i c a t e d  
a fundamen ta l  l a c k  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  mechanisms o f  p y r o t e c h n i c  
d e v i c e s  and  s y s t e m s ,  f o l l o w e d  by n o t  r e c o g n i z i n g  p y r o t e c h n i c s  as a n  e n g i -  
n e e r i n g  t e c h n o l o g y ,  i n s u f f i c i e n t  manpower w i t h  "hands-on1' e x p e r i e n c e  which h a s  
led t o  a heavy dependence  on m a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  too few in -house  test  f a c i l i t i e s ,  
and  i n a d e q u a t e  g u i d e l i n e s  and  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  d e s i g n ,  development ,  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  and a c c e p t a n c e .  Recommendations are made on b o t h  a m a n a g e r i a l  
and  t e c h n i c a l  b a s i s  t o  p r e v e n t  c o n t i n u e d  p y r o t e c h n i c  sys t em f a i l u r e s ,  i n c r e a s e  
re l . l a h i  l i t y ,  improve e x i s t i n g  and f u t u r e  d e s i g n s ,  and  d e v e l o p  t h e  t e c h n o l o g y  
t ~ ,  meet fu tu r r ?  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
INTRODUCTION 
P y r o t e c h n i c s ,  as  a  term u s e d  h e r e i n ,  comprise b o t h  e x p l o s i v e  and  
p r o p e l l a n t - a c t u a t e d  mechanisms, b u t  e x c l u d e  p r o p u l s i o n .  P y r o t e c h n i c s  have  
a c c o m p l i s h e d  a  l a r g e  number o f  t h e  mechan ica l  f u n c t i o n s  f o r  s p a c e  m i s s i o n s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  24 f o r  Apollo, a n d  w h i l e  e x t r e m e l y  h i g h  r e l i a b i l i t y  h a s  been  
d e m o n s t r a t e d  i n  b o t h  manned and  unmanned a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  n a g g i n g  s y s t e m  f a i l u r e s  
c o n t i n u e  t o  o c c u r .  These  f a i l u r e s  have  c a u s e d  t h r e e  d e a t h s  and  have  r e s u l t e d  
i n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x p e n s e  i n  r e d e s i g n ,  r e q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  repeat o f  s y s t e m  tests, 
a n d  f l i g h t  d e l a y s ,  as w e l l  as t h e  less d e f i n a b l e  l o s s e s  i n  morale and p r e s t i g e  
t h r o u g h  e x p e r i e n c i n g  f l i g h t  f a i l u r e s .  
Norman R.  S c h u l z e  of t h e  O f f i c e  o f  Associate A d m i n i s t r a t o r  f o r  S a f e t y ,  
R e l i a b i l i t y ,  M a i n t a i n a b i l i t y  a n d  Q u a l i t y  Assurance ,  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  s h o r t -  
and  long- term management o f  p y r o t e c h n i c  f a i l u r e s ,  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  i n t e r - C e n t e r  
c o o r d i n a t i o n  c o u l d  be t h e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  a p p r o a c h  to  d e f i n i n g ,  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  
a n d  r e d u c i n g  t h e s e  f a i l u r e s .  The p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i t s  o f  i n t e r - C e n t e r  coor- 
d i n a t i o n  were d e m o n s t r a t e d  by t w o  h i g h l y  s u c c e s s f u l  programs unde r  h i s  manage- 
ment: t h e  "NASA Aerospace  F l i g h t  B a t t e r y  Sys tems Program" a n d  t h e  
" ~ h u t t l e / C e n t a u r  Super*Zip  S e p a r a t i o n  J o i n t  F a i l u r e  A n a l y s i s  and  R e s o l u t i o n  
program". R e f e r e n c e  1 p r o v i d e s  a summary o f  t h e  b a t t e r y  e x p e r i e n c e ,  a n d  
r e f e r e n c e  2 p r o v i d e s  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  Super*Zip  t e c h n i c a l  r e s o l u t i o n .  
Both o f  t h e s e  programs a d d r e s s e d  e x i s t i n g  complex p rob lems  and f a i l u r e s  w i t h  
m u l t i p l e  c a u s e s .  A r e s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  Super*Zip  f a i l u r e  w a s  a c h i e v e d  i n  real 
t i m e  w i t h  a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by e v e r y  NASA C e n t e r ,  as w e l l  as t h e  A i r  F o r c e  
a n d  Navy and  f o u r  i n d u s t r i a l  u s e r s ,  t o  immedia t e ly  implement improvements i n  
e x i s t i n g  f l i g h t  sys t ems .  The e f f i c i e n t  i n t e r - C e n t e r  c o o r d i n a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  
t h e  c r e a t i o n  of t h e  NASA/DOD Aerospace  P y r o t e c h n i c  Sys tems S t e e r i n g  Committee,  
coml)osed o f  l e a d i n g  p y r o t e c h n i c  t e c h n o l o g i s t s  from t h e  NASA C e n t e r s ,  t h e  Space  
D i v i s i o n ,  A i r  F o r c e  Sys tems Command, a n d  t h e  Naval  S u r f a c e  War fa re  C e n t e r  
( t a b l e  I ) .  
The need t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  p rob lems  i n  t h e  p y r o t e c h n i c  community 
became t h e  o b v i o u s  f i r s t  a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  s t e e r i n g  committee. Each o f  t h e  
c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  s u p p l i e d  f a i l u r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  l e s s o n s  l e a r n e d  t o  be u s e d  
f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h i s  p a p e r :  
1. P r o v i d e  a c o m p i l a t i o n  o f  p y r o t e c h n i c  f a i l u r e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
program impac t ,  s o u r c e s  o f  f a i l u r e s ,  a n d  r e s o l u t i o n s .  
2. Analyze t h e  past f a i l u r e s  to  d e t e r m i n e  when t h e y  o c c u r r e d  
i n  t h e  u s e  c y c l e  and  t h e  b a s i c  c a u s e s  f o r  o c c u r r e n c e s .  
3 .  Consider  s p e c i f i c  p y r o t e c h n i c  technology d e f i c i e n c i e s  
t h a t  a l lowed f a i l u r e s  t o  occur .  
4. Recommend t e c h n i c a l  and manager ia l  approaches  t o :  
a .  I n c r e a s e  r e l i a b i l i t y  through f a i l u r e  p r e v e n t i o n  
b. Provide t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and p r a c t i c a l  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  
unders tand ing  of p y r o t e c h n i c  f u n c t i o n a l  mechanisms. 
c. Improve e x i s t i n g  d e s i g n s  and p r o v i d e  improved d e s i g n  
approaches  and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  as t h e  technology base  
expands.  
d.  Develop t h e  technology t o  meet f u t u r e  requ i rements .  
PROCEDURES FOR FAILURE SURVEY AND ANALYSIS 
T h i s  s e c t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  approach used i n  conduc t ing  t h e  p y r o t e c h n i c  
f a i l u r e  su rvey  and t h e  subsequent  a n a l y s i s  t o  p r o v i d e  d i r e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  f i n a l  
recommendations. 
Survey Approach 
The i n t e n t  of t h i s  f a i l u r e  su rvey  was t o  develop an  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  of t h e  problems i n  t h e  p y r o t e c h n i c  d i s c i p l i n e ,  n o t  t o  ga in  t e c h n i c a l  
d e s i y n  in format ion  on t h e  f a i l u r e s .  Fur thermore,  t o  e x p e d i t e  t h e  e f f o r t  and 
reduce t h e  t ime commitment by t h e  committee s o u r c e s  ( t a b l e  I )  t h e  emphasis w a s  
p l a c e d  on s i m p l i c i t y .  Br ie f  s t a t e m e n t s  w e r e  r e q u e s t e d  on f a i l u r e s  of hardware 
t h a t  w a s  a f t e r  d e s i g n  and w a s  i n  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  sys tem t e s t i n g ,  l o t  a c c e p t a n c e  
t e s t i n g ,  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  phases  of p r e f l i g h t  p r e p a r a t i o n s ,  f l i g h t ,  o r  i n  long- 
t e rm s t o r a g e ,  s e r v i c e  l i f e  e v a l u a t i o n .  Requested were t h e  y e a r  of t h e  
f a i l u r e ,  a b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  f a i l u r e ,  t h e  p r o j e c t  impact ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
actual  and po tent ia l  i f  t h e  f a i l u r e  mode had remained u n d e t e c t e d ,  t h e  s o u r c e  
o f  t h e  f a i l u r e ,  and t h e  f a i l u r e  r e s o l u t i o n .  Obviously ,  t h e  p r o j e c t  impact  f o r  
eclcli f a i l u r e  was a n  a p p r e c i a b l e  s c h e d u l e  d e l a y  and c o s t ,  s o  o n l y  s t a t e m e n t s  of 
a d d i t i o n a l  impacts beyond t h e s e  were s o l i c i t e d .  The f a i l u r e  s o u r c e  c a t e g o r i e s  
and t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  t a b l e  11, i n c l u d i n g  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  proce-  
d u r e s ,  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l ,  d e s i g n ,  t e c h n i c a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  and m i s a p p l i c a t i o n s .  
No recluests were made f o r  r e f e r e n c e s  o r  documentation on any of t h e  f a i l u r e s .  
A n a l y s i s  Approach 
The f a i l u r e s  were grouped i n t o  s e v e r a l  c a t e g o r i e s  f o r  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e n  a 
s u b j e c t i v e  assessment  was made t o  a t t e m p t  t o  e x p l a i n  how and why t h e s e  
f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d .  The f a i l u r e s  were f i r s t  c a t e g o r i z e d  i n t o  p y r o t e c h n i c  
f u n c t i o n s ,  a n d  t h e n  were summed i n  terms o f  t o t a l s  f o r  ( a )  e a c h  f u n c t i o n a l  
c a t e g o r y ,  ( b )  when t h e y  o c c u r r e d  i n  t h e  l i f e  c y c l e  o f  t h e  d e v i c e ,  a n d  (c)  t h e  
s o u r c e  o r  c a u s e  o f  e a c h  f a i l u r e .  
The f u n c t i o n a l  c a t e g o r i e s  were: i n i t i a t i o n ,  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  f i r s t  i n p u t  
i n t o  t h e  d e v i c e  to  s t a r t  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  t r a i n ;  mechanisms, m e c h a n i c a l  d e v i c e s  
u s e d  t o  accompl i sh  a d e s i r e d  f u n c t i o n ;  s e p a r a t i o n  j o i n t s  and l i n e a r  e x p l o s i v e s  
which are a t y p e  o f  d e v i c e  t h a t  can  be a p p l i e d  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  l o n g  l e n g t h s  t o  
s e v e r  and  release s t r u c t u r e ,  s u c h  a s  r o c k e t  s t a g i n g ;  and  f i r i n g  c i rcui t s ,  
t h o s e  electr ical  s y s t e m s  u s e d  t o  p r o v i d e  i n p u t  e n e r g y  t o  i n i t i a t e  p y r o t e c h n i c  
d e v i c e s .  
The "when t h e  f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d "  c a t e g o r i e s  f o r  d e v i c e s  w i t h  comple t ed  
d e s i g n  were q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  m a n u f a c t u r e  o f  t h e  f u l l y  q u a l i f i e d  d e v i c e ,  l o t  
a c c e p t a n c e  t e s t i n g ,  s y s t e m s  t e s t i n g ,  f l i g h t  a s sembly ,  f l i g h t  and  s e r v i c e  l i f e  
e v a l u a t i o n ,  or long-term s t o r a g e .  The " s o u r c e  o r  c a u s e  o f  f a i l u r e s ' '  cate- 
g o r i e s  are l i s t e d  i n  t a b l e  11: S p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  p r o c e d u r e s ,  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l ,  
d e s i g n ,  t e c h n i c a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  and  m i s a p p l i c a t i o n s .  For  t h o s e  f a i l u r e s  w i t h  
more t h a n  one  f a i l u r e  c a t e g o r y ,  o n l y  t h e  p r i m a r y  c a u s e  w a s  s t a t e d .  
A s u b j e c t i v e  a s s e s s m e n t  w a s  t h e n  made on t h e  " s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t "  o f  
p y r o t e c h n i c  t e c h n o l o g y  t h a t  would e x p l a i n  why t h e s e  f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d .  
C o n s i d e r e d  w e r e :  ( a )  r e c o g n i t i o n  by t h e  e n g i n e e r i n g  community o f  p y r o t e c h n i c s  
a s  a t e c h n i c a l  e n t i t y ,  ( b )  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  d e s i g n ,  development  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  
and  t e s t i n g ,  ( c )  communica t ion ,  ( d l  s o u r c e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  ( e l  r e l i a n c e  on  
m a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  ( € 1  tes t  f a c i l i t i e s ,  ( g )  manpower, ( h )  t r a i n i n g ,  ( i )  s t a n d a r d s  
For r e q u i r e m e n t s  and  hardware ,  ( j )  f u t u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  and  (k) f u n d i n g .  
RESULTS 
T h i s  s e c t i o n  summarizes t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  s u r v e y  and t h e  
d n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  compi l ed  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
Su rvey  Compi l a t ion  
The l i s t i n g  o f  f a i l u r e s  is p r e s e n t e d  i n  t a b l e s  I11 t h r o u g h  VI u n d e r  t h e  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  i n i t i a t i o n ,  mechanisms,  s p a c e c r a f t  s e p a r a t i o n  j o i n t s  and  l i n e a r  
e x p l o s i v e s  and f i r i n g  c i r c u i t s .  To b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  f o r m a t ,  
a  more d e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  on r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  examples  f o r  e a c h  c a t e g o r y  is  
y i v e n .  
I n i t i a t i o n . -  The most infamous  p y r o t e c h n i c  f a i l u r e  w a s  t h e  1964 D e l t a  
program r o c k e t  motor  i g n i t i o n  a t  Cape Kennedy t h a t  k i l l e d  t h r e e  p e o p l e  and  
i n j u r e d  e i g h t .  The f i lament-wound,  f i b e r g l a s s  motor  w i t h  a s sembled  s p a c e c r a f t  
w a s  mounted i n  a  v e r t i c a l  s t a n d  and  c o v e r e d  w i t h  a p r o t e c t i v e  plast ic  s h e e t .  
I n  r o l l i n g  u p  t h e  e d g e s  o f  t h e  s h e e t  t o  t h e  t o p  o f  t h e  a s sembly  t o  a l l o w  
ac:cess t o  t h e  s l ~ a c e c r a f t ,  t h o u s a n d s  o f  v o l t s  o f  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  e n e r g y  were 
cjel lerated.  Thesc  v o l t a g e s  c a u s e d  a n  e lec t r ica l  breakdown t h r o u g h  t h e  i n i -  
t i a t i o n  mix between t h e  case and f i r i n g  l e a d s  o f  a n  i n t e r n a l l y  mounted s q u i b  
(e lc?c : t r ica l  i n i t i a t o r ) .  The approach  f o r  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  p r o t e c t i o n  a t  t h a t  
t i m e  w a s  c o m p l e t e l y  wrong. The r e s o l u t i o n  w a s  t o  r e d e s i g n  t h e  s q u i b  and 
i g n i t e r  t o  r e d u c e  e l e c t r o s t a t i c  e n e r g y  s e n s i t i v i t y ,  as w e l l  as e l i m i n a t e  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a c h i e v i n g  e l e c t r o s t a t i c a l l y  g e n e r a t e d  v o l t a g e s  a t  s e n s i t i v e  
l o c a t i o n s .  
The 1986 f a i l u r e  of  t h e  NASA S t a n d a r d  I n i t i a t o r  (NSI )  t o  f u n c t i o n  i n  a 
-260° F l o t  a c c e p t a n c e  t e s t  p r e s e n t s  a major  impact on a wide v a r i e t y  o f  s p a c e -  
c r a f t  f u n c t i o n s .  Should  t h e  f a i l u r e  n o t  be r e s o l v e d ,  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  NSI may 
be  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  s p e c i a l  f i r i n g  c i r c u i t s  o r  f o r  u s e  a t  w a r m e r  t e m p e r a t u r e s .  
Fo r  example,  a dichotomy between o p e r a t i o n a l  env i ronmen t  and  p e r f o r m a n c e  l i m i -  
t a t i o n  is t h e  S h u t t l e ' s  hydrogen u m b i l i c a l  d i s c o n n e c t  which must  f u n c t i o n  a t  
-420°  F. The c a u s e  o r  s o u r c e  o f  f a i l u r e  is a l a c k  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  
m a t e r i a l s  and/or  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  c o n t r o l s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a c h i e v e  r e l i a b l e  i n i -  
t i a t i o n ;  t e s t  f i r i n g s  i n  s amples  o f  some few l o t s  have  a l l  f u n c t i o n e d ,  w h i l e  
t h e  m a j o r i t y  of  lots  have  had  f u n c t i o n a l  f a i l u r e s .  No f a i l u r e s  can  be 
t o l e r a t e d .  
Mechanisms.- The 1987 f a i l u r e  o f  two Mage l l an  p i n  p u l l e r s  h a s  f a r  greater 
p o t e n t i a l  impact  t h a n  is i n i t i a l l y  a p p a r e n t .  T h i s  p i n  p u l l e r  w a s  t h e  same 
u n i t  f u l l y  q u a l i f i e d  f o r  t h e  V i k i n g  Lander s p a c e c r a f t  f o r  t h e  1976 l a n d i n g  on 
t h e  s u r f a c e  o f  Mars. A f t e r  t h i s  e x p e r i e n c e  and w i t h  i ts p e d i g r e e ,  t w o  u n i t s  
from a d u p l i c a t e  l o t  o f  p i n  p u l l e r s  f a i l e d  t o  f u n c t i o n  i n  a f a i l u r e  mode n o t  
r e c o g n i z e d  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d e s i g n ,  development  and q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
e x t r e m e l y  dynamic p r e s s u r e  impu l se  o u t p u t ,  as d e s i g n e d ,  o f  t h e  NSI, when f i r e d  
i n t o  a  small e c c e n t r i c a l l y  v e n t e d  c a v i t y  w a s  s e v e r e l y  a t t e n u a t e d ,  r e d u c i n g  t h e  
e n e r g y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  s t r o k e  t h e  p i s t o n .  Fu r the rmore ,  t h e  bo t tom o f  t h e  c a v i t y  
was deformed by t h e  p r e s s u r e  i n t o  a groove  i n  t h e  p i s t o n ,  which had  t o  s t r o k e  
t o  p u l l  t h e  p i n .  T h i s  d e v i c e  may have  a lways  been  m a r g i n a l  when o p e r a t e d  by a 
s i n g l e  c a r t r i d g e  i n p u t .  
S p a c e c r a f t  s e p a r a t i o n  j o i n t s  and  l i n e a r  e x p l o s i v e s . -  The 1983 a n d  1984 
c o l d - t e m p e r a t u r e  f a i l u r e s  o f  t h e  S h u t t l e / C e n t a u r  s e p a r a t i o n  j o i n t  w e r e  c a u s e d  
b y  a l a c k  of  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  how t h e  mechanism works.  It w a s  d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  
t . 1 ~  pl.atc?s t h a t  were t o  be e x p l o s i v e l y  f r a c t u r e d  were t o o  t h i c k  and  t o o  s o f t  
( r e f e r e n c e  2 ) .  The c r i t i c a l  t h i c k n e s s  w a s  n o t  a t  t h e  p o i n t  o f  f r a c t u r e ,  b u t  
a t  t h e  p o i n t s  where bend ing  o c c u r r e d  t o  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  dynamic stress a t  t h e  
p o i n t  of  f r a c t u r e .  To a v o i d  stress c o r r o s i o n  s e n s i t i v i t y  t h e  p l a t e  m a t e r i a l  
h a r d n e s s  w a s  changed from earl ier  s y s t e m s  t h r o u g h  a n n e a l i n g  f rom a f r a c t u r e -  
s e n s i t i v e  c o n d i t i o n  t o  a f r a c t u r e - r e s i s t a n t  c o n d i t i o n .  Al though t h e  j o i n t  was 
suc :cessfu l ly  s e v e r e d  i n  e a r l y  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  tests d e s p i t e  t h i s  s o f t  c o n d i t i o n ,  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  margin  had  been  l o s t  w i t h o u t  t h e  
knowledge of  sys t em d e s i g n e r s .  
F i r i n g  c i r c u i t s . -  The 1987 l a u n c h  p a d  l i g h t n i n g  s t r i k e  i g n i t i o n  o f  t h r e e  
o f  f o u r  sound ing  r o c k e t s  w a s  c a u s e d  by e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c a l l y  i n d u c e d  e n e r g y  i n  
p a r t i a l l y  s h i e l d e d  and grounded f i r i n g  l e a d s .  F a c i l i t y  ha rdware  and  p r o c e d u r e s  
had been used  s u c c e s s f u l l y  f o r  o v e r  30 y e a r s  of l a u n c h  o p e r a t i o n s .  An u n u s u a l  
s t o r m  w i t h  sudden l i g h t n i n g  i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  sys t em weaknesses .  
DATA ANALYSIS 
T h i s  s e c t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  r e s u l t s  of  t h e  f a i l u r e  s u r v e y  i n  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
terms and p r o v i d e s  a s u b j e c t i v e  a s s e s s m e n t  to  h e l p  e x p l a i n  why t h e  f a i l u r e s  
o c c u r r e d .  
p u a n t i t a t i v e  summary.- The t o t a l  number o f  f a i l u r e s  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h i s  s u r -  
vey  w a s  84. The f r e q u e n c y  o f  o c c u r r e n c e  f o r  t h e  23-year p e r i o d  is shown i n  
f i y u r e  1. The g r e a t e s t  number o f  f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d  i n  1984 w i t h  a n  a v e r a g e  o f  
3.65 f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  p e r i o d .  The f l i g h t  f a i l u r e s  are s c a t t e r e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  
p e r i o d .  The number o f  f a i l u r e s  i n  e a c h  f u n c t i o n a l  c a t e g o r y  is shown i n  f i g u r e  
2.  The number of  f a i l u r e s  i n  a d e v i c e  l i f e  c y c l e  is shown i n  f i g u r e  3. Of 
c o u r s e ,  t h e  key s t a t i s t i c  is t h a t  12 f l i g h t  f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d  f o l l o w i n g  q u a l i -  
f i c a t i o n ,  l o t  a c c e p t a n c e  t e s t i n g ,  sys t ems  t e s t  and  f l i g h t  a s sembly .  F i g u r e  4 
summarizes  t h e  p y r o t e c h n i c  f a i l u r e  o c c u r r e n c e s  i n  terms of s o u r c e s  or causes. 
Assessment  on r e a s o n s  f o r  f a i l u r e s . -  T h i s  s e c t i o n  is a c o m p i l a t i o n  o f  
l l s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t l '  o p i n i o n s  by t h e  NASA/DOD Q r o t e c h n i c  S t e e r i n g  Committee as 
t o  how and why t h e s e  f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d .  These  o p i n i o n s  are s u b d i v i d e d  and  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c a t e g o r i e s :  p y r o t e c h n i c  t e c h n o l o g y  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  
g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  d e s i g n ,  development  and q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  communica t ion ,  s o u r c e s  
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  r e l i a n c e  on m a n u f a c t u r e r s ,  t es t  f a c i l i t i e s ,  manpower, 
t r a i n i n g ,  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  and  ha rdware ,  f u t u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  
f undincj. 
P y r o t e c h n i c  t e c h n o l o g y  r e c o g n i t i o n . -  P y r o t e c h n i c s  have  n o t  been  
r e c o g n i z e d  as a s e p a r a t e  and  d i s t i n c t  t e c h n o l o g y ,  b u t  have  been r e l e g a t e d  t o  a 
s u b s y s t e ~ n  l e v e l  of  p r o p u l s i o n  o r  s t r u c t u r e s .  Even worse ,  p y r o t e c h n i c  d e v i c e s  
~3r-c: c o n s i d e r e d  a n a l o g o u s  t o  " n u t s  and  b o l t s " ,  i n  t h a t  no fundamen ta l  e n g i -  
n e c r i n g  d e s i g n  is n e c e s s a r y ;  t h e y  need  o n l y  be p u r c h a s e d  and a p p l i e d .  P a s t  
e d i c t s  have  shown t h e  g e n e r a l  o p i n i o n  and  t h e  conce rn  f o r  p y r o t e c h n i c  u s e ,  o n e  
o f  t h e  mre r e c e n t  b e i n g ,  " P y r o t e c h n i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s  are p r o h i b i t e d  f o r  b o t h  
t h e  S h u t t l e  v e h i c l e  and S h u t t l e  pay loads . "  O t h e r  messages  r a n g e  f rom ''Don't 
c o n s i d e r  them, u n l e s s  you have  t o , "  t o  " s q u i b s  are p r e t t y  r e l i a b l e . "  Program 
managers g e n e r a l l y  have  l i t t l e  background e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  p y r o t e c h n i c  s y s t e m s ,  
o r  \lave h e a r d  h o r r o r  s t o r i e s  of  u n e x p l a i n e d  f a i l u r e s ,  and  r e a l i z i n g  t h e  
s c a r c i t y  of  e x p e r i e n c e d  p e r s o n n e l ,  have  a v o i d e d  t h e i r  u s e .  I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e s e  
n e g a t i v e  o p i n i o n s ,  p y r o t e c h n i c s  do have  t h e i r  place i n  d e s i g n  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
s i n g u l a r ,  n o n - r e p e t i t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  demand enormous amounts  o f  d i r e c t e d  
e n e r g y  i n  s h o r t  p e r i o d s  o f  t i m e .  
G u i d e l i n e s  f o r  d e s i g n ,  development  and  q u a l i f i c a t i o n . -  No s t a n d a r d i z e d  
y u i c i e l i n e s  e x i s t  w i t h i n  NASA f o r  p y r o t e c h n i c  sys t em d e s i g n ,  deve lopmen t  and  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  a s  does  t h e  A i r  F o r c e  ( r e f e r e n c e  3 ) .  Development b o r d e r s  on 
macjic arid s u p e r s t i t i o n .  Subsequen t  f a i l u r e s  l e a v e  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  
p y r o t e c h n i c s  are dange rous ,  damaging,  and  a t  b e s t ,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o n t r o l .  Some 
p a s t  p y r o t e c h n i c  subsys t em managers have  a c t u a l l y  conveyed t o  t h e i r  program 
managers t h a t  no one  can  r e a l l y  u n d e r s t a n d  how t h e s e  d e v i c e s  work; t h e y  d o n ' t  
f o l l o w  any known e n g i n e e r i n g  l a w s .  S i n c e  p y r o t e c h n i c s  are s i n g l e - s h o t  d e v i -  
ces, p a s t  a p p r o a c h e s  f o r  d e m o n s t r a t i n g  r e l i a b i l i t y  have  r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  on 
d e v e l o p i n g  a s t a t i s t i c a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  w i t h o u t  a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  func -  
t i o n a l  mechanisms and  t h e  r e l a t i v e  impor t ance  o f  sys t em parameters. T h a t  is, 
o n c e  a s u c c e s s f u l  pe r fo rmance  w a s  a c h i e v e d ,  emphas i s  w a s  p l a c e d  on  
a c c o m p l i s h i n g  l a r g e  numbers o f  c o n s e c u t i v e  s u c c e s s e s .  (More t h a n  2000 u n i t s  
a r c  needed t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  99.99 p e r c e n t  r e l i a b i l i t y  a t  a 95 p e r c e n t  c o n f i d e n c e  
l e v e l . )  However, t h e  c u r r e n t  app roach  o f t e n  is  t o  r u n  f u l l - s c a l e  s y s t e m s  
tests on as few a s  s i x  a s s e m b l i e s  o r  less w i t h  no s t a t i s t i c a l  g u a r a n t e e  of  
r e l i a b i l i t y ,  and  w i t h o u t  an  a d e q u a t e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  how t h e  mechanisms func -  
t i o n ,  a p r e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  d i s a s t e r .  
Communication.- Most C e n t e r s  work t h e i r  p y r o t e c h n i c  e f f o r t s  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  
w i t h  l i t t l e  i n t e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  c o o p e r a t i o n  o r  s h a r i n g  o f  t e c h n i c a l  g a i n s ,  
p r o b l e m s ,  f a i l u r e s  and r e s o l u t i o n s .  The re  h a s  been  l i t t l e  mutua l  p a r t i c i -  
p a t i o n  among C e n t e r s  i n  d e s i g n  r ev iews .  
S o u r c e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n . -  No l i b r a r y  o r  c e n t r a l  s o u r c e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
e x i s t s  t h a t  is remote ly  o r i e n t e d  towards  c u r r e n t  a e r o s p a c e  p y r o t e c h n i c  
t e c h n o l o g y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a da t abank  on p a s t  f a i l u r e s .  The f a i l u r e  s u r v e y  i n  
t h i s  p a p e r  was compi led  p r i m a r i l y  i n f o r m a l l y ,  on  t h e  b a s i s  o f  memory o f  t h e  
S t e e r i n g  Committee members. Few p u b l i c a t i o n s  e x i s t  i n  t h i s  h i g h l y  s p e c i a l i z e d  
area.  Pew programs t h o r o u g h l y  document and  p u b l i s h  d e s i g n s ,  f u n c t i o n a l  per- 
formance and p h y s i c a l  e n v e l o p e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  a  f o r m a t  p e r m i t t i n g  t r a d e  
s t u d i e s  needed f o r  new d e s i g n s .  The b e s t  p y r o t e c h n i c  t e c h n o l o g y  is i n  t h e  
minds of  a  h a n d f u l  of  s p e c i a l i s t s  w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  g e n e r a l  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  assess 
new a p p l i c a t i o n s .  
R e l i a n c e  on m a n u f a c t u r e r s . -  Many Government o r  p r i m e - c o n t r a c t o r  py ro -  
t e c h n i c  managers do n o t  have  t e c h n i c a l  backgrounds  t o  work on an e q u a l  b a s i s  
w i t h  p y r o t e c h n i c  m a n u f a c t u r e r s .  T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  h a s  l e d  t o  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  
e d u c a t i n g  t h e  cus tomer  on t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  p y r o t e c h n i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  f o l l o w e d  
by the m a n u f a c t u r e r  b e i n g  t h r u s t  i n t o  making a p r o p o s a l  w i t h o u t  a r e a s o n a b l e  
unc lc r s t and ing  of  sys t em r e q u i r e m e n t s .  T h i s  app roach  r e s u l t s  i n  a  cus tomer  who 
is now l a r g e l y  dependen t  on t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r  f o r  development  o f  key  p y r o t e c h -  
n i c  components  w i t h o u t  a  c l e a r  d e f i n i t i o n  on sys t em i n t e r f a c i n g .  A l s o ,  t h e  
m a n u f a c t u r e r  s h o u l d  n o t  be r e l i e d  upon t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  and  r e s o l v e  ha rdware  
f a i l u r e s  w i t h  comple t e  o b j e c t i v i t y  b e c a u s e  of  h i s  v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t .  F i n a l l y ,  
i t  is n o t  r s a s o n a h l e  t o  e x p e c t  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  t o  accompl i sh  r e s e a r c h  and  deve- 
lopmcnt t o  meet f u t u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w i t h o u t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by t h e  
Government o r  11rime c o n t r a c t o r .  
T e s t  f a c i l i t i e s . -  The NASA a n d  A i r  F o r c e  have  v e r y  few test  f a c i l i t i e s  
------- 
t h a t  are d e s i g n e d  f o r  c o n d u c t i n g  p y r o t e c h n i c  r e s e a r c h ,  deve lopmen t  and  
d e m o n s t r a t i o n .  Of t h e  few f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  e x i s t ,  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  have  t o  be 
r e a c t i v a t e d  and s t a f f e d  on demand. T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  n o t  o n l y  d e c r e a s e s  t h e  
d e p t h  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  p e r s o n n e l  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  s t a y  a b r e a s t  and  advance  t h e  
s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t ,  b u t  a g a i n  f o r c e s  r e l i a n c e  on t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s .  
Manpower.- P y r o t e c h n i c  p e r s o n n e l  are g e n e r a l l y  t r a n s i e n t ,  a s s i g n e d  or 
h i r e d  f o r  a temporary  e f f o r t  on a  s p e c i f i c  program, and  n o t  encouraged  t o  s t a y  
i n  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n .  A c t u a l l y ,  many p y r o t e c h n i c  s t a f f s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  i n  t h e  
NASA, are d e c r e a s i n g  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  e v e r  more demanding p y r o t e c h n i c  a p p l i c a -  
t ionr; .  For example,  McDonnell A i r c r a f t  Company, S t .  I o u i s ,  M i s s o u r i ,  a l e a d e r  
i n  p y r o t e c h n i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  s u c h  as crew e s c a p e  sys t ems  i n  t h e  Mercury,  
Gemini and t h e  F-111 a i r c r a f t ,  i n  t h e  past 3 y e a r s  h a s  e x p e r i e n c e d  a r e d u c t i o n  
o f  s e n i o r  s t a f f  from s e v e n  t o  t h r e e .  NASA-JSC is  t h e  o n l y  C e n t e r  t h a t  h a s  
r e c o g n i z e d  and r e v e r s e d  t h i s  t r e n d .  
T r a i n i n g . -  N o  f o r m a l  t r a i n i n g  e x i s t s  t h a t  meets t h e  needs  f o r  t o d a y ' s  
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  p y r o t e c h n i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  The re  is no e n g i n e e r i n g  c u r r i c u l u m  
d e v o t e d  t o  p y r o t e c h n i c s  a t  any c o l l e g e  o r  u n i v e r s i t y .  Very few s a f e t y  c o u r s e s  
a r e  a v a i l a b l e  to  a s s u r e  p e r s o n n e l  s a f e t y  i n  h a n d l i n g  and u s i n g  p y r o t e c h n i c s ,  
a n d  t o  p r o v i d e  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  sys t ems  i n  which p y r o t e c h n i c s  are a p p l i e d .  
P e r s o n n e l  a c t i v e  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  u s u a l l y  have  r e c e i v e d  t h e i r  e d u c a t i o n  f rom t h e  
small h a n d f u l  o f  men to r s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  s e c t i o n  on s o u r c e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
T h e r e  are few p y r o t e c h n i c  p e r s o n n e l  w i t h  t h e  "hands-on" e x p e r i e n c e  n e c e s s a r y  
t o  c o n s t r u c t  and  a p p l y  t h e  optimum a p p r o a c h e s  f o r  d e s i g n ,  deve lopmen t ,  quali-  
f i c a t i o n  and l o t  a c c e p t a n c e  t e s t i n g .  The g r e a t e s t  l a c k  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  is  i n  
t e s t i n g  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  mechanisms and r e l a t i v e  impor t ance  o f  p y r o t e c h n i c  
s y s t e m  v a r i a b l e s  o f  p y r o t e c h n i c  d e v i c e s  t o  p r o v e  f u n c t i o n a l  marg ins .  
S t a n d a r d s  f o r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  and  hardware.-  Most C e n t e r s  d e v e l o p  t h e i r  own 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  and hardware  d e s i g n  p h i l o s o p h i e s ,  which can  v a r y  c o n s i d e r a b l y .  
A l so ,  managers  i n  r u s h i n g  t o  u s e  " o f f - t h e - s h e l f "  hardware  t o  r e d u c e  costs, 
o f t e n  d i s c o v e r  a rnismatch i n  form, f i t  o r  f u n c t i o n ,  and  t h e n  are f o r c e d  i n t o  a 
r e d e o i g n  and "make-i t -work" mode. Many p o t e n t i a l  u s e r s ,  s u c h  as u n i v e r s i t y -  
nponso red  e x p e r i m e n t e r s ,  c a n n o t  a f f o r d  to  d e v e l o p  and q u a l i f y  p y r o t e c h n i c s  f o r  
t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  sys t em r e q u i r e m e n t s .  No low-cos t ,  h i g h - r e l i a b i l i t y  com-  
p o n e n t s ,  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  Governmen t - fu rn i shed  NASA S t a n d a r d  I n i t i a t o r ,  are 
a v a i l a b l e .  Hence, new p r o d u c t s  are c o n t i n u o u s l y  o f f e r e d  and t h e  consequence  
i s  new problems o r  t h e  r e i n v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  o l d  ones .  The re  is no a p p a r e n t  
m o t i v a t i o n  o r  g e n e r a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  t o  d e v e l o p  a d d i t i o n a l  s t a n d a r -  
d j  zed  components .  However, d i f f i c u l t i e s  have  been  e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  t h e  applica- 
t i o n  of t h e  NASA S t a n d a r d  I n i t i a t o r .  A s  d e s i g n e d ,  t h e  o u t p u t  o f  t h e  NASA 
S t a n d a r d  I n i t i a t o r  p r o d u c e s  a dynamic (high-pressure/short-duration) o u t p u t ,  
which is s u i t a b l e  f o r  i t s  i n t e n d e d  i g n i t i o n  f u n c t i o n .  However, p rob lems  h a v e  
o c c u r r e d  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  u s e  i ts o u t p u t  t o  accompl i sh  m e c h a n i c a l  f u n c t i o n s  as 
a  p r e s s u r e  g e n e r a t o r .  
F u t u r e - r - u i r e m n e n t s . -  No s h a r e d  approach  h a s  been  e s t a b l i s h e d  on 
recocjn iz ing  p y r o t e c h n i c  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o r  t e c h n o l o g y  development  needed f o r  
futurc:  ~ n i s s i o n s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t e c h n o l o g i s t s  are t r y i n g  t o  r e spond  as t h e  
n e e d s  o c c u r ,  w i t h o u t  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  d e v e l o p  a t e c h n o l o g y  b a s e  o r  have  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  advanced sys t em d e f i n i t i o n s .  
T h i s  o f t e n  leads t o  b e i n g  "des igned  i n t o  a c o r n e r ; "  t h a t  is, f o r c e d  t o  
a c c o m p l i s h  a f u n c t i o n  w i t h  p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  on i n p u t  e n e r g y ,  
w e i g h t ,  volume and o u t p u t  pe r fo rmance .  Fu r the rmore ,  s i n c e  p y r o t e c h n i c  s y s t e m s  
a r e  g e n e r a l l y  s o  un ique  ( d e s i g n e d  f o r  s p e c i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s )  a n d  c o s t l y ,  manu- 
f a c t u r e r s  c a n n o t  be e x p e c t e d  t o  i n t e r n a l l y  f u n d  r e s e a r c h  and development  to  
m e e t  f u t u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
k ' u n d i . . -  T h e r e  is no g e n e r a l  r e s e a r c h  and development  a d v o c a t e  n o r  f u n d  
- -- 
s o u r c e  from e i t h e r  t h e  NASA o r  t h e  A i r  F o r c e  Space  D i v i s i o n  I i e a d q u a r t e r s  d e d i -  
cdt.e(i to so lv inc j  p y r o t e c h n i c  problems and  to  m e e t i n g  r e c ~ u i r e r n e n t s  f o r  advanced 
a e r o s p a c e  p y r o t e c h n i c  sys t ems .  A l l  p y r o t e c h n i c  f u n d i n g  is now ea rmarked  by 
p r o j e c t s ,  whost: l i m i t e d  s c h e d u l e s  and  funds  o f t e n  p r e c l u d e  o r  r e s t r i c t  new 
dcvelopmcnt .  These  r e s t r i c t i o n s  f o r c e  p y r o t e c h n i c  managers t o  a t t e m p t  t o  u s e  
s u p p o s e d l y  " o f f - t h e - s h e l f "  hardware ,  which o f t e n  w i l l  n o t  meet t h e  c u r r e n t  
s y s t e m  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  T h i s  r e s u l t s  i n  p r o t r a c t e d ,  c o s t l y  and  i n e f f i c i e n t  
d e s i g n  and development  e f f o r t s .  
CONCLUSIONS 
I n  an  e f f o r t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  c a u s e s  o f  and  p r e v e n t i n g  c o n t i n u i n g  
f a i l u r e s  i n  s p a c e c r a f t  s y s t e m s  u s i n g  p y r o t e c h n i c s ,  which are e x p l o s i v e  and  
p r o p e l l a n t - a c t u a t e d  mechanisms, e x c l u d i n g  p r o p u l s i o n ,  a s u r v e y  and  a n a l y s i s  
h a s  been conduc ted  on hardware  f a i l u r e s  t h a t  o c c u r r e d  i n  t h e  f i n a l  p h a s e s  o f  
s y s t e m  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  T h a t  is ,  a f t e r  d e s i g n  and  i n  o r  f o l l o w i n g  sys t em q u a l i -  
f i c a t i o n .  The a n a l y s i s  i n c l u d e d  when and t h e  c a u s e s  f o r  o c c u r r e n c e ,  t h e  
" s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t "  t h a t  a l l o w e d  f a i l u r e s  and  recommend improvements.  
The t o t a l  number of f a i l u r e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h r e e  d e a t h s ,  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h i s  
s u r v e y  was 8 4  f o r  t h e  23-year p e r i o d  o f  t h e  c o m p i l a t i o n  w i t h  a n  a v e r a g e  o f  
3.65 p e r  y e a r .  The s u r v e y  was an  i n f o r m a l  c o m p i l a t i o n ,  b a s e d  on memory and 
l i m i t e d  documen ta t ion .  No C e n t e r  m a i n t a i n s  a comple t e  f o r m a l  record o f  
f a i l u r e s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  no t e c h n i c a l  problem d a t a  b a s e  h a s  been e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
t l i i s  stucly. The f a i l u r e  r a t e s  p e r  f u n c t i o n a l  c a t e g o r y  w e r e  32 i n  mechanisms, 
30 i n  i n i t i a t i o n ,  14 i n  s e p a r a t i o n  sys t ems  and 8 i n  e lec t r ica l  f i r i n g  cir- 
c u i t s .  A t o t a l  of 12, o r  o v e r  14 p e r c e n t ,  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d  i n  f l i g h t  
w i t h  15 i n  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  1 i n  manufac tu re  f o l l o w i n g  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  33 i n  l o t  
a c c e p t a n c e  t e s t i n g  (LAT), 14 i n  sys t ems  tests, 5 i n  f i n a l  a s sembly  and  4 i n  
s e r v i c e  l i f e  e v a l u a t i o n  tests.  C l e a r l y ,  some l o t  a c c e p t a n c e  t e s t i n g  is  ade- 
q u a t e  i n  d i s c o v e r i n g  f l a w s  i n  f u n c t i o n a l  pe r fo rmance .  However, some l o t  
a c c e p t a n c e  t e s t i n g  needs  improvement, s i n c e  more f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d  a f t e r  t h i s  
t c ? s t i n q  t h a n  b e f o r e .  
For t h e  s o u r c e  o f  f a i l u r e s ,  t h e  s h o c k i n g  s t a t i s t i c  is t h a t  35 o f  8 4  ( 4 2  
p e r c e n t )  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e s  were  c a u s e d  by a l a c k  of  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ;  t h a t  is, t h e  
p e r s o n n e l  working  t h e  problem a t  t h e  t i m e  d i d  n o t  have  t h e  t e c h n o l o g y  needed 
t o  u n d e r s t a n d  and c o r r e c t  t h e  f a i l u r e .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  2 4  w e r e  m i s t a k e s ,  
c a u s e d  by poor  d e s i g n s  and m i s a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  hardware ,  which means t h a t  per- 
s o n n e l  d i d  n o t  a p p l y  t h e  known t e c h n o l o g y .  The n e x t  22 f a i l u r e s  have  t o  be 
c a t e g o r i z e d  a s  c a r e l e s s n e s s ,  t h r o u g h  m a n u f a c t u r e r s '  p o o r  p r o c e d u r e s  and  
q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l .  Program managers  were a t  f a u l t  i n  t h r e e  cases i n  n o t  h a v i n g  
e s t a b l i s h e d  c o r r e c t  p r o c e d u r e s  and  c r e a t i n g  a n  i n c o r r e c t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
The a s s e s s m e n t  a s  t o  t h e  r e a s o n s  why and how t h e s e  f a i l u r e s  o c c u r r e d  
show t h e  need f o r  many improvements.  P y r o t e c h n i c s  s h o u l d  be r e c o g n i z e d  as a n  
e n g i n e e r i n g  t e c h n o l o g y ,  n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  a subsys t em o f  o t h e r  d i s c i p l i n e s ,  or 
even  worse " n u t s  and  b o l t s "  and  magic. The l a c k  o f  e x p e r i e n c e d  p e r s o n n e l  have  
d i s c o u r a g e d  program managers  from e a r l y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  u s e ,  even  when 
important b e n e f i t s  c a n  be  a c h i e v e d .  G u i d e l i n e s  are needed f o r  p y r o t e c h n i c  
s y s t e m  d e s i g n ,  deve lopmen t ,  (which  i n c l u d e s  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n a l  
m a r g i n s ) ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  and a c c e p t a n c e .  Some p a s t  managers have  a c t u a l l y  
i m p l i e d  t h a t  p y r o t e c h n i c s  c a n n o t  r e a l l y  be  u n d e r s t o o d ,  and  t h e  b e s t  t h a t  can  
bo done is t o  d e v e l o p  s t a t i s t i c a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n s  o f  s u c c e s s .  T h a t  is, o n c e  a 
s r l c c e s s f u l  pe r fo rmance  w a s  a c h i e v e d ,  r e l i a b i l i t y  w a s  b a s e d  on r e p e a t e d  
s u c c e s s .  S t a t i s t i c a l  a p p r o a c h e s  are n o t  a  p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  where cost is t h e  
key ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when e n t e r e d  i n t o  w i t h o u t  knowing i f  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  o v e r -  or 
m a r y i n a l l y  d e s i g n e d .  
I n a d e q u a t e  communicat ion and t h e  l a c k  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  have  p r e v e n t e d  t h e  
o p t i m i z a t i o n  o f  d e s i g n  a p p r o a c h e s  and  f a i l u r e  a n a l y s e s .  Most C e n t e r s  h a v e  
worked p y r o t e c h n i c  e f f o r t s  i n d e p e n d e n t l y .  Few p y r o t e c h n i c  p u b l i c a t i o n s  ex i s t ,  
w i t h  no l i b r a r y  o r  c e n t r a l  s o u r c e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  l a c k i n g  is a 
d a t a b a n k  f o r  f a i l u r e s .  Wi thou t  s h a r i n g ,  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  c a p i t a l i z i n g  on 
t h e  v a r i e d  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  h a n d f u l  o f  s p e c i a l i s t s  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  is 
l i m i t e d .  
The re  is an  i n a d e q u a t e  number o f  e x p e r i e n c e d  p y r o t e c h n i c  p e r s o n n e l  a n d  
c a p a b l e  tes t  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  a s s u r e  s u c c e s s f u l  s y s t e m  management. More 
e x p e r i e n c e d  p y r o t e c h n i c  p e r s o n n e l  and  test  f a c i l i t i e s  are needed.  Wi thou t  
s u f E i c i e n t  manpower, t r a i n i n g ,  and  tes t  f a c i l i t i e s ,  program managers  have  h a d  
t o o  g r e a t  a  r e l i a n c e  on m a n u f a c t u r e r s .  P y r o t e c h n i c  p e r s o n n e l  have  no  f o r m a l  
t . r a i n i n q  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  are g e n e r a l l y  t r a n s i e n t ,  and  are n o t  e n c o u r a g e d  t o  
s t a y  i n  t h e  f i e l d .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t o o  heavy a r e l i a n c e  on m a n u f a c t u r e r s  h a s  
e v o l v e d  i n  e d u c a t i n g  p y r o t e c h n i c  managers ,  as w e l l  a s  p r o p o s i n g  on p y r o t e c h n i c  
s y s t e m s  w i t h o u t  an  a c c u r a t e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e r e  is  
a  need  f o r  p e r s o n n e l ,  working  i n  a c t i v e  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  d e v e l o p  "hands-on" 
e x p e r i e n c e  t o  become more knowledgeable  cus tomers ,  t o  manage s y s t e m  f a i l u r e  
a n a l y s e s ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  from t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s '  v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t s ,  and  t o  c o n d u c t  
t h e  n e c e s s a r y  r e s e a r c h  and development  t o  m e e t  f u t u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
Too many s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  and  t o o  wide a  v a r i e t y  o f  p y r o t e c h n i c  d e v i c e s  
e x i s t ,  c r e d t i n g  c o s t l y  c o n f u s i o n  i n  s e l e c t i o n  by u s e r s ,  as w e l l  as c o n t i n u a l l y  
c r e a t i n g  new problems o r  r e i n v e n t i n g  t h e  old ones .  Each C e n t e r  h a s  d e v e l o p e d  
i t s  own s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  and p r e f e r r e d  hardware .  S t a n d a r d i z e d  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
ant3 hardware ,  e x t e n d i n g  t h e  approach  o f  p r o v i d i n g  Government- furn ished  e q u i p -  
ment ,  would g r e a t l y  f a c i l i t a t e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  and u s e  o f  p y r o t e c h n i c  s y s t e m s ,  
as w e l l  a s  e n h a n c i n g  sys t em r e l i a b i l i t y .  However, t o  a v o i d  t h e  ma jo r  p i t f a l l  
oE m i s a p p l y i n g  t echno logy ,  clear d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  sys t em p e r f o r m a n c e  capabili- 
t i e s  must be deve loped  and documented. 
No p y r o t e c h n i c  t e c h n o l o g y  p l a n n i n g  e x i s t s  on an  agency-wide b a s i s .  T h e r e  
is a need  t o  d e v e l o p  o v e r a l l  NASA Headquar t e r s - sponso red  p l a n n i n g  t o  manage 
t h i s  d i s c i p l i n e .  H e a d q u a r t e r s  a d v o c a t e s  are needed f o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and  
f u n d i n g  s u p p o r t  t o  i n f l u e n c e  a l l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l e v e l s  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  act i-  
v i t i e s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e l e v a t e  p y r o t e c h n i c s  t o  a t e c h n o l o g y  and i n c o r p o r a t e  t h i s  
t e c h n o l o g y  i n t o  an a c t i v e  r o l e  i n  management s t r u c t u r e s ,  create a p rob lem 
r e p o r t i n g  and communication system, and p r o v i d e  t h e  necessa ry  funding,  inde-  
pendent  from major program o f f i c e s ,  t o  accomplish in-house a p p l i c a t i o n a l  
s t u d i e s ,  f a i l u r e  a n a l y s e s  and r e s e a r c h  and development. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The f o l l o w i n g  recommendations a r e  o f f e r e d  f o r  meet ing t h e  p y r o t e c h n i c  
technology needs d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  above conc lus ions :  
1. Cont inue i n t e r - C e n t e r  c o o r d i n a t i o n  through t h e  NASA/DOD 
Aerospace P y r o t e c h n i c  Systems S t e e r i n g  Committee and symposia 
a c t i v i t i e s  t o :  
a .  Promote technology exchange 
b. A s s i s t  i n  problem s o l v i n g  and f a i l u r e  r e s o l u t i o n  
c. Support  d e s i g n  reviews 
d. Conduct independent  t e c h n i c a l  a ssessments  of systems. 
2.  Provide g u i d e l i n e s ,  handbooks and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  
d e s i g n ,  development,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  l o t  accep tance ,  s a f e t y ,  
r e l i a b i l i t y  and q u a l i t y  a s s u r a n c e  
3. Encourage r e c r u i t m e n t  and r e t e n t i o n  of p y r o t e c h n i c  
p e r s o n n e l  
4. Provide s a f e t y  and e n g i n e e r i n g  t r a i n i n g ,  i n c l u d i n g  
"hands-on" e x p e r i e n c e  
5. Compile e x p e r i e n c e  through a NASA-wide p y r o t e c h n i c  
problem r e p o r t i n g  system t o  main ta in  a technology 
base .  
6. Expand t h e  concept  of Government-furnished equipment 
wi th  c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  f u n c t i o n a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
7. Recommend and implement p y r o t e c h n i c  p l a n n i n g  t o  
improve p e r s o n n e l  e x p e r i e n c e  and p r o v i d e  f o r  needed 
technology and development. 
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TABLE I1 
FAILURE SOURCE CATEGORIES AND D E F I N I T I O N S  
1. Incorrect Specification - An unnecessary or erroneous requirement. 
2. Bad System Test Procedures - System test procedures inadequate or erroneous. 
3. Manufacturer's Poor Quality Control - All quality control in place, but 
not followed. 
4. Manufacturer's Bad Procedures - The quality control procedures or 
manufacturing methods inadequate. 
5. Bad Design - Personnel did not apply known technology. 
6. Lack of Understanding - Personnel did not have the needed technology. 
7. Misapplication of Hardware - Use of previously qualified device in an 
inappropriate application. 
TABLE 11 I 
DATE 
SOURCE OF 
FA1 LLTRE RESOLL'TION 
C l a s s i f i e d  
U n i v e r s a l  
A p p l i c a t i o n  
S S I  f a i l e d  t o  f i r e  
d u r i n g  s e p a r a t i o n  nut  
t e s t  ( v i b r a t i o n -  
induced  s e p a r a t i o n  of 
I p y r o t e c h n i c  mix from 
1 b r i d g e w i r e )  
Br idgewi re  r e s i s t a n c e  
LAT f a i l u r e s  f o l l o w i n g  
e l e c t r o s t a t i c  t e s t i n g  
and shipment 
NASA Standa rd  I n i  t t a -  
t o r  (NSI) f a i l e d  t o  
f u n c t , i o n  i n  Lot  Accep- 
t a n c e  T e s t i n g  (LAT) a t  
-260" F 
De tona to r  f u n c t i o n e d  
i n  e l e c t r o s t a t  L C  d i s -  
c h a r g e  LAT ( i n c a p a b l e  
of  s h u n t i n g  energy  
away from e x p l o s i v e )  
Loss of l o t  and po- 
t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and mis s ion  
Loss of l o t  
I n d i c a t i o n  of b a s i c  
weakness of NSI, a s  
w e l l  a s  p o t e n t i a l  l o s s  
of  co ld- tempera ture  
m i s s i o n s  i n  STS o r  
wide  v a r i e t y  of space- 
c r a f t  m i s s i o n s  
Lack of under- 
/ s t a n d i n g  
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
R e j e c t e d  l o t ,  q u a l i f i e d  
new l o t  
P o t e n t i a l  premature 
i n i t i a t i o n  i n  hand l ing ,  
i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  and In 
ground t e s t  
R e j e c t e d  l o t  
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
S t i l l  i n  work 
Changed procedures ,  reduced 







M i s s i l e  
HALOE 
1984 
P i n p u l l e t  f o r  t e l e -  
scope cover f a i l e d  t o  
f u n c t i o n  at  high- 
c u r r e n t  input i n  
systems development 
( f o i l  bridgewire broke 
t o o  soon) 
FAILURE 
Universa l  
Appl ica t ion  
Detonator f o r  s t a g i n g  
f a i l e d  t o  func t ion  i n  
LAT (bridgewire-to- 
p r o p e l l a n t  s e p a r a t i o n )  
IMPACT 
I n i t i a t o r  f a i l i n g  LAT 
due t o  3% of l o t  ex- 
h i b i t i n g  increased 
r e s i s t a n c e  t o  open 
c i r c u i t s  ( t ime depen- 
den t  co r ros ion  of 
br idgewire)  
NASA Standard I n i t i -  
a t o r  (NSI) f a i l e d  i n  
LAT ( requ i red  too  much 
t ime t o  func t ion)  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and l o s s  of 
miss ion  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and l o s s  of 
miss ion  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and l o s s  of 
miss ion  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and l o s s  of 
miss ion f o r  wide 
v a r i e t y  of s p a c e c r a f t  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE RESOLLTION 
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
Redesigned,  r e q u a l i f  i ed  
Lack of under- / Redesigned, new load ing  pro- s t a n d i n g  and manu cedures  and r e q u a l i f  i e d  f a c t u r e r ' s  bad procedures  
Manufacturer ' s  
poor q u a l i t y  
c o n t r o l  
I Lack of under- 
i s t a n d i n g  
Could not d u p l i c a t e  
f a i l u r e .  Cleaned up 
p l a n t ,  enhanced c o n t r o l  
Re jec ted  l o t ,  r e v i s e d  manu- 
f a c t u r i n g  procedures  
NASA/AIR FORCE MROSPACE PYROTECHNIC FAILURES 
I N I T I A T I O N  ( C O h T I N U E D )  
DATE P R O J E  C r IMPACT 
SOURCE OF 
FAIT,ITRE 
S h u t t l e  SRB e x p l o s i v e  t r a n s f e r  
m a n i f o l d  s i d e  bushing 
f a i l e d  i n  LAT(bushing 
C l a s s i f i e d  Rocket motor i n i t i a t o r  
b r i d g e w i r e s  opened 
( o v e r t o r q u i n g  d u r i n g  
i n s t a l l a t i o n )  
P o t e n t i a l  damage to  
S h u t t l e  from fragment  
impact  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy,  l o s s  of 
m i s s i o n  
Delt.? 
S h u t t l e  
- X~~XXX~X~SX~XX~~XXX~~~~XXXXXX~X~XXXXXXXXX~~~~~~~ 
Detona to r  f o r  r o c k e t  
a s s i s t  f a i l e d  i n  [.AT 
( e x t r a n e o u s  w i re  
a c r o s s  b r i d g e w i r e s  
1 SRB n o z z l e  s eve rance  
1 c h a r g e  f a i l e d  LAT 
( l a r g e  p a r t i c l e  
e x p l o s i v e )  




P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy, l o s s  of 
m i s s i o n  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
I n i t i a t o r s  f a i l e d  t o  
f i r e  a t  7-ampere 
f l i g h t  l e v e l ;  deve l -  
oped a t  3.5 amperes 
C l a s s i f i e d  
P o t e n t i a l  i n c r e a s e d  
damage t o  SRB c a s e  a t  
w a t e r  impact  
Loss  of mi s s ion  
M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  
poor q u a l i t y  con- 
t r o l  
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
R e j e c t e d  l o t  
Reduced i n s t a l l a t i  on 
t o r q u e ,  r e d e s i g n e d ,  r e -  
q u a l i f i e d  
Manuf a c  t d r e r  ' s 
poor qual .€ty con- 
t r o l  
x x x x x x x ~ x ~ ~ x x x x x x ~ x x x ~ ~ ~ x ~ ~ x x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x X x x x  
Bad des ign  
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
I n c r e a s e d  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  




Redes igned ,  r e s t r i c t e d  u se  
of r e c y c l e d  e x p l o s i v e ,  r e -  
q u a l i f i e d  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXx~xXXXXXXXxxxxxxx 
XXXXXXXX FLIGHT FAILIlRE 
DATE PRO J E  a 
-- 
Delta  
C l a s s i f i e d  
S h u t t l e  
Del ta  
I Del ta  
TABLE I11 
NASA/AIR FORCE AEROSPACE PYROTECHNIC FAILURES 
INITIATION (CONTINUED) 
FAILURE 1 IMPACT 
Explosive t r a n s f e r  
assembly f a i l e d  t o  
func t ion  i n  LAT (over- 
heated explos ive  i n  
welding assembly) 
I n i t i a t o r  f a i l e d  LAT 
-65' F f i r i n g  (im- 
proper  f i r i n g  c u r r e n t )  
Crew escape exp los ive  
t r a n s f e r  l i n e  f a i l e d  
t o  propagate i n  U T  
(exp los ive  cord over- 
compressed i n  swaging 
assembly) 
C u t t e r  f a i l e d  t o  func- 
t i o n  i n  ground t e s t  
(misapp l i ca t ion  of 
c u r r e n t  below a l l - f i r e  
1 l e v e l  before applying 
f i r i n g  s i g n a l  
Explos ive  bo l t  f a i l e d  
t o  func t ion  i n  LAT 
(misplaced component 1 i n  i n i t i a t o r )  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy, l o s s  of 
miss ion  
Loss of l o t ,  p o t e n t i a l  
l o s s  of redundancy and 
miss ion  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy, l o s s  of 
e scape  c a p a b i l i t y  
Delay of t e s t ,  l o s s  of 
hardware 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy, l o s s  of 
miss ion  
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE 
Manufacturer ' s  
poor q u a l i t y  con- 
t r o l  
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
Bad manufac- 
t u r e r ' s  procedure 
Bad system t e s t  
procedures  
Manufacturer ' s  
bad procedures 
RESOLUTION 
Rejected l o t ,  inc reased  
q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
Manufactured new l o t  
Re jec ted  l o t ,  modified 
t o o l i n g  and manufacturing 
procedures  
Improved q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l :  
procedures  and equipment 
c a l i b r a t i o n  
Re jec ted  l o t ,  inc reased  
q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
TABLE 111 
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DATE 
De l r a  
D e l t a  
D e l t a  
C l a s s i f i e d  
C l a s s i f i e d  
FAILL'RE 
D e t o n a t a r  (one  of l o t )  
f unc t  ia~ned  i n  e l e c t r o -  
s t a t i c  LAT 
E x p l o s i v e  t r a n s f e r  
l i n e s  f o r  r d c k e t  
a s s i s t  i g n i t i o n  f a i l e d  
t o  p ropaga te  i n  LAT 
( t i p  s e a l  i n t r u d e d  In- 
t o  gap  a n d  b locked  
o u t p u t  of donor ex- 
p l o s  t v e s )  
Rocket  a s s i s t  s a f e / a rm 
f a i l e d  t o  p ropaga te  i n  
LAT ( imprope r ly  re- 
t a i n e d  t r a n s f e r  cha rge  
Valve c a r t r i d g e  f a i l e d  
LAT ( ex t r eme ly  long  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  f u n c t i o n  
t i m e s )  
I n i t i a t o r  f a i l e d  t o  
1 f i r e  i n  f u n c t i o n a l  
t e s t  ( s l u r r y  b r idge -  
, w i r e  mix f l a k i n g  off  
i n  two-year time 
f r ame)  
P o t e n t i a l  pe r sonne l  
h a z a r d ,  premature  
f u n c t i o n  i n  pre- 
l aunch  
IMPACT 
Delay of f l i g h t .  Po- 
t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and l o s s  of 
m i s s i o n  
SOURCE OF 
FAILL'RE 
Delay of f l i g h t .  Po- 
t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and l o s s  of 
' m i s s i o n  
Schedule  d e l a y  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and mis s ion  
M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  
poor  q u a l i t y  con- 
t r o l  
Bad d e s i g n  
Bad d e s i g n  
Laclc of under- 
s t and i n g  
Lack of under- 
s t a c d i n g  
RESOLUTION 
Accepted l o t  
Redes igned  ( s h o r t e n e d  t i p  
s e a l )  
Redes igned ,  r e q u a l i f  i e d  
Changed vendor,  used 
b r i d g e w i r e  i n s t e a d  of 
t h i n  f i l m  b r i d g e  
Redes igned ,  r e q u a l i f i e d  
TABLE I11 










C l a s s i f i e d  
C l a s s i f i e d  
Universa l  
Appl ica t ion  
Apollo 
FAILURE 
Standard i n i t i a t o r  
f a i l e d  t o  func t ion  
under cold-temperature 
LAT 
Reefing c u t t e r  f a i l e d  
dur ing  system t e s t  
(manufacturer ' s change 
i n  de lay  mix which re- 
s u l t e d  i n  i n a b i l i t y  t o  
i g n i t e  output charge)  
C a r t r i d g e s  f a i l e d  t o  
f i r e  i n  s e r v i c e  l i f e  
e v a l u a t i o n  ( l o s s  of 
s e a l )  
Apollo s tandard i n i t i -  
a t o r  functioned i n  
e l e c t r o s t a t i c  LAT 
(epoxy i n  spark gap) 
End detonat ing c a r t -  
r i d g e  f o r  i n t e r s t a g e  
g u i l l o t i n e  f a i l e d  t o  
f u n c t i o n  i n  LAT 
(a lcoho l  i n t r u s i o n  in- 
t o  explos ive)  
IMPACT 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and l o s s  of 
miss ion 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and miss ion 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and miss ion 
P o t e n t i a l  hazard t o  
pe r sonne l ,  premature 
i n i t i a t i o n  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
redundancy, l o s s  of 
miss ion  
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE 
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
Manufacturer ' s  
poor q u a l i t y  
c o n t r o l  
Bad des ign 
Manufacturer ' s  
bad procedures 
Manufacturer ' s  
bad procedures 
RESOLUTION 
Enhanced q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
Redesigned, r e q u a l i f i e d  
Redesigned, r e q u a l i f i e d  
Modified manufacturer ' s  
procedures  and q u a l i t y  
c o n t r o l  
Modified manufacturer 's 
procedures  and q u a l i t y  
c o n t r o l  
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A t l a s  
D e l t q  
IMP9CT 
Redundant  d e t o n a t o r s  
f a i l e d  t o  i n i t i a t e  
v e h i c l e  d e s t r u c t  
( c o n t a m i n a t e d  ex- 
p l o s i v e  d e g r a d a t i o n )  
E l e c t r o s t a t i c  d i s -  
c h a r g e  i g n i t i o n  of 
s q u i b  i n  500-pound 
s o l i d  r o c k e t  ,no tor  i n  
v e r t i c a l  s t a n d  
SOURCE OF 
FAT '.I'RE RESOLI'T TO?; 
>(XXXX~XXXXXX~XX~X)~XXXXXXYXXYXXXYY.~SX>(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.YXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXYXXXXXXXXXYXXX~~~~~~~~ 
Loss  of ~ n i s s i o n  
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Y X X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X X Y M X X X ~ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
3 p e o p l e  k i l l e d ,  8 
i n j u r e d .  De lay  of 
f l i g h t  
Yanufac  t u r e r ' s  
bad p r o c e d u r e s  
Lack o f  under-  
s t a n d i n g  
S c r a p p e d  l o t ;  enhanced  X 
p r o c e d u r e s  and q u a l i t y  X 
c o n t r o l  X 
X 
X 
R e d e s i g n e d  s q u i b  and 
i g n i t e r  
TABLE I V  
NASA/AIR FORCE AEROSPACE PYR(TPECHN1C FAILURES 
FLTSATCOM 
DATE I PROJECT 
Magellan 
FAILL'RE 
I n i t i a t o r  o u t p u t  p e r -  
f  ormance degrading  i n  
s e r v i c e  l i f e  program 
P i n  p u l l e r  f a i l e d  t o  
s t r o k e  a g a i n s t  f l i g h t  
s i d e  l o a d  (NSI o u t p u t  
r e s t r i c t e d ,  c a u s i n g  
r educed  o u t p u t  and 
h o u s i n g  deformat ion  
a g a i n s t  working p i s t o n  
N 
W 
1986 I TITAN 3 4 D  F a i r i n g  d e t o n a t o r  
Magellan 
O r b i t e r  
f a i l e d  LAT o u t p u t  test  
(Charge d i s p l a c e d  i n  
t e m p e r a t u r e  c y c l i n g )  
B o l t  c u t t e r  f a i l e d  LAT 
( improper  compression 
margin t e s t  r e q u i r e -  
ment )  
P i n p u l l e r  f a i l e d  t o  
f u n c t i o n  i n  LAT (NSI 
produced i n s u f f i c i e n t  
p r e s s u r e  caused  by 
c o a t i n g s  o f  p r e s s u r -  
i z e d  volume) 
IMPACT 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
mi s s ion  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of l o t  
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE RESOLLJTION 
Lack o f  under-  
s t a n d i n g  
Bad d e s i g n ,  m i s -  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of  
hardware  
Unnecessary f a i l u r e  I I n c o r r e c t  s p e c i -  C o r r e c t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  a n a l y s i s ,  a d d i t i o n a l  f i c a t i o n  I 
I n c r e a s e d  f requency of 
s u r v e i l l a n c e  t e s t i n g  
Replaced,  r e q u a l i f i e d  
) 
t e s t i n g  ($300K) 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of  re- 
dundancy and mis s ion  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of  re- 
dundancy, l o s s  of  
m i s s i o n  
Lack of  under-  
s t a n d i n g  
Redesigned,  r e q u a l i f i e d  
M i s a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
hardware ,  l a c k  o f  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
Changed manufac turer  and 
d e s i g n  
ThELF, IT 
NASA/AIR FORCE AEROSPACE PYROTECHNIC FAILURES 
SOURCE OF 
FATI,IIRE RESOLUTION DATE 
1984 
XXXXX 




S h u t t l e  
INTEI,SAT V 
P R O J E C T  
S h u t t l e  
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
S h u t t l e  
F.; 1 LI.'RE 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
M P A C T  
R e l e a s e  n u t  f a i l e d  i n  
f l i g h t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
a t  502 p r o p e l l a n t  l o a d  
S h u t t l e  O r b i t e r / E T  
s e p a r a t i o n  b o l t  f a i l e d  
t o  meet LAT l o a d  re- 
q u i r e m e n t s  ( c r a c k  i.1 
s h a n k  ) 
S e p a r a t i o n  n u t  de- 
l i v e r e d  w i t h  an in-  
t e r n a l  g a s  p o r t  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy ,  l o s s  of 
s i s s i o n  
P o t e n t i a l  p remature  
f u n c t i o n ,  l o s s  of 
m i  s s i o n  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
I m i s s i o n  
m i s s i n g  I I 
S h u t t l e  O r b i t e r / E T  
s e p a r a t i o n  b o l t  f a i l e d  
t o  p r o d u c e  c l e a n  se- 
p a r a t i o n  p l a n e  i n  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  (iq- 
t e r n a l  p i s t o n  e x t e n d e d  
beyond s e p a r a t i o n  
p l a n e )  
P o t e n t i a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
i n  s e p a r a t i o n ,  l o s s  
o f  m i s s i o n  
Lack of under-  R e d e s i g n e d  
s t a n d i n g  
M a n u f a c t u r e r  ' s 
bad  p r o c e d u r e s  
M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  
I p o o r  q u a l i t y  
c o n t r o l  
Bad d e s i g n  
Improved h e a t  t r e a t m e n t  
and q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
I 1 
XXXXXXX)(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxXXXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXX 
E n s u r e  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  
p r o c e d u r e s  
R e d e s i g n e d ,  r e q u a l t f i e d  
Bad d e s i g n  N o s e g e a r  e x t e n s i o n  
t h r u s t e r  f a i l e d  ( a c t u -  
a t i o n  p i s t o n  p a r t e d )  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
R e d e s i g n e d  and r e q u a l i f i e d  X 
I X 
X 
XXYXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X K x X x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
O r b i t e r  
DATE PRO JE CT 
1983 
TABLE I V  
NASA/AIR FORCE AEROSPACE PYROTECBNIC FAILURES 








G a l i l e o  
Ulysses  
Ground Tes t  
F i x t u r e  
De l t a  
IUS 
1 FA1 LURE 1 IMPACT 1 FAILURE 1 RESOLUTION SOURCE OF 
Bellows a c t u a t o r  f o r  
l e n s  cover f a i l e d  i n  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  (housing 
rup tu red ,  vent ing pro- 
p e l l a n t  r e s idue)  
Release nut f a i l e d  t o  
f u n c t i o n  i n  q u a l i f i -  
c a t i o n  (NSI d e l i v e r s  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  energy)  
Explosive b o l t s  exper- 
ienced t e n s i l e  
f a i l u r e s  during load 
t r a n s f e r  c a r r i a g e  drop 
t e s t i n g  (hydrogen em- 
b r i t t l e m e n t  ) 
C a r t r i d g e  exceeded 
maximum al lowable  out- 
put  i n  LAT 
Redundant de tona to r  
f a i l e d  t o  func t ion  
a f t e r  being sub jec ted  
t o  shock generated by 
f i r s t  de tona to r  
d a t a  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy, contamina- 
t i o n  of experiment,  
l o s s  of photo-opt ica l  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
miss ion  
Loss of experiment 
Manufacturer ' s  
poor q u a l i t y  
c o n t r o l  
P o t e n t i a l  damage t o  
s t r u c t u r e  
Improved manufacturer ' s  
q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
Manufacturer ' s 
bad procedures 
Misapp l i ca t ion  of 
hardware, l a c k  of 
unders tanding 
Bad des ign 
Redesigned ( inc reased  
p r o p e l l a n t  load)  
Define m a t e r i a l  and pro- 
c e s s i n g  procedures wi th  
a d d i t i o n a l  demonstra t ion 
Redesigned (decreased 
p r o p e l l a n t  load) ;  repeated 
LAT 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and miss ion 
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
Redesigned, r e q u a l i f i e d  
TXRSC I!' 
NASA/AIR FORCE AEROSPACE PYROTECHNIC FAILURES 
FhIi, lTRE 
S e p a r a t i o n  nut re-  
l e a s e d  when s u b j e c t e d  
t o  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
mechan ica l  shock t e s t .  
Nut mod i f i ed  t o  use 
o n l y  NSI 
SRB nose  cap  t h r u s t e r  
c a r t r i d g e  produced t o o  
low o u t p u t  i n  LAT 
I n i t i a t o r s  f a i l e d  TAT 
o u t p u t  per f  orrnance 
( low p r e s s u r e  and long  
i g n i t i o n  d e l a y .  
M a t e r i a l  incowpat i -  
b i l i t y )  
P a r a c h u t e  drogue  
m o r t a r  t ube  f r d c t u r e d  
( h i g h  p r e s s u r e s  
c r e a t e d  by NSI f r a c -  
t u r i n g  p r o p e l l a n t )  
IPIP4CT 
P o t e n t i a l  premature r e -  
l e a s e  and l o s s  of 
mi s s ion  
P o t e n t i a l  f a i l u r e  t o  
j e t t i s o n  nose cap ,  
l o s s  of s p e n t  SRB 
Loss of l o t ,  p o t e n t i a l  
l o s s  of redundancy and 
m i s s i o n  
P o t e n t i a l  contamina- 
t i o n  or  damage t o  
s p a c e c r a f t ,  r e d u c t i o n  
i n  performance,  l o s s  








S h u t t l e  
C l z s s i f i e d  
C l a s s i f i e d  
SOURCE OF 
FAILI!RE 
M i s a p p l i c a t i o n  of 
hardware ,  l a c k  of 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  
poo r  q u a l i t y  con- 
t r o l  
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
Lack of under- 
s t a r ~ d i n g  
SESOLI'TIOK 
Redesigned 
R e j e c t e d  l o t  
Redes igned ,  r e q u a l i f i e d  
Redes igned  i n t e r f a c e  
TABLE 1'; 










C l a s s  i f  i e d  
Centaur  
TREP 
FAILURE I DIPACT 
P i n  p u l l e r  body rup- 
t u r e d  du r ing  system 
t e s t  ( i nadequa te  con- 
ta inment  margin and 
v a r i a t i o n  i n  m e t a l  
g r a i n  o r i e n t a t i o n )  
A t l a s  Centaur nose  
f a i r i n g  exp los ive  b o l t  
e x h i b i t i n g  wide range 
o f  s t r e n g t h s  i n  qual-  
i f  i c a  t i o n  (manuf ac- 
t u r i n g  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  
h a r d n e s s )  
Through-bulkhead i n i -  
t i a t o r s  f a i l e d  t o  
f u n c t i o n  i n  LAT high- 
t empera tu re  t e s t s  
(contaminated ex- 
p l o s i v e )  
Exp los ive  t r a n s f e r  
l i n e  connector  blown 
o f f  a redundant  
t hrough-bulkhead i n i -  
t i a t o r  i n  i g n i t i o n  
test ( rearward  detona- 
t i o n )  
P o t e n t i a l  contamina- 
t i o n  of s p a c e c r a f t ,  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  pe r fo r -  
mance 
P o t e n t i a l  premature o r  
f a i l u r e  t o  f u n c t i o n ,  
l o s s  of mi s s ion  
Loss  of l o t ,  p o t e n t i a l  
l o s s  of redundancy, 
l o s s  of mi s s ion  
P o t e n t i a l  s p a c e c r a f t  
damage and contami- 
n a t i o n  
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE RESOLUTION 
Manufac tu re r ' s  
bad p rocedures  
Modify p rocedures  t o  
machine g rooves ,  based on 
m a t e r i a l  h a r d n e s s  
Manufac tu re r ' s  
bad p rocedures  
Enhanced p rocedures  
and q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
NASAIAIR FORCE AEROSPACE PYROTECENIC FAILURES 
>!ECiiAYIS\lS ( C O N T I N U E D )  
SOLiRCE OF 
FAILURE I 
F i r i n g  p i n  a s s e m b l i e s  
c o r r o d e d  and l o c k e d  
i n  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- Bad d e s i g n  R e d e s i g n e d ,  r e q u a l i f l e d  
dundancy ,  l o s s  of a i r -  
c r a f t  and crew 
XXXXXXXX~XSYSSSXSXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~XXXXKX~~~XXXXX~XXXXXXX~X~XXXX~XXX~XXXX~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXKXXXXXXXXXXXX 
C l a s s i f i e d  




l\j ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x ~ ~ X X ~ ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x x x x x i x x x m x X x x x ~ x x x x x ~ x x x x i x x x ~ x ~ x x x x x x x x x ~ x x ~ x x x x x x x X x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  
P i n  p u l l e r  f a l l e d  
d u r i n g  s y s t e m  test  
( c a r t  r i d g e  c losur .2  




Atlas C e n t a u r  nose  
f a i r i n g  e x p l o s i v e  b o l t  
f a i l e d  i n  q u a l i f i c a -  
t i o n  ( s e c o n d a r y  
p i s t o n  p a r t e d  a f t e r  
b o l t  a c t u a t i o n )  
XXXXXXKXL~XXXXXXY.YX~XXXXXXXXXxXXXXXx~~xxxxxXXxxxxmxxmxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxmxxXxxxxxxmxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
I I I 1 I 
S i k e  /Xpache 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
r e d u n d a n c y  and m i s s i o n  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXYXXmXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxmxxxxxxxxxxmxxxxmxxxxxxxxmxxmxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Kike!Apache 
P o t e n t i a l  damage t o  
s p a c e c r a f t  due t o  
d e b r i s  
P a y l o a d  d o o r  b e l l o w s  
f a i l e d  i n  f l i g h t  t o  
r e l e a s e  d o o r  
Lack of  undr r -  
s t a n d i n g  
P a y l o a d  d o o r  b e l l o w s  
f a i l e d  i n  f l i g h t  t o  
r e l e a s e  d o o r  
Bad d e s i g n  
L o s s  of m i s s i o n  
R e d e s i g n e d ,  r e q u a l i f i e d  
I 
R e d e s i g n e d ,  r e q u a l i f  i e d  
L o s s  of m i s s i o n  
XXXXXXXX FLIGHT PAT LIRE 
Bad d e s i g n  R e d e s i g n e d ,  r e q u a l i f i e d  X 
X 
X 








~ X X X X ~ X X X ~ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ X X X X ~ & &  I XxxxxXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 







C l a s s i f i e d  
Explos ive  b o l t  func- 
t ioned  dur ing  vibra- 
t ion  t e s t i n g  in  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
F A 1  LLXE 
X X M U U ( X X X X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X X ~ X X X ~ X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Centaur 
Door r e l e a s e  assembly 
f a i l e d  t o  func t ion  
(nonsimul tanei ty  of 
four-point  r e l e a s e  
system) 
P i s t o n  a c t u a t o r  f o r  
high-temperature 
e l e c t r i c a l  swi tch  
f a i l e d  t o  f u n c t i o n  
( inadequate  c a p a b i l i t y  
IMPACT 
At las  Centaur nose 
f a i r i n g  explos ive  nut 
f a i l e d  t o  s e p a r a t e  i n  
f l i g h t  ( n u t  segments 
imbedded i n  washer) 
P o t e n t i a l  personnel  
s a f e t y  hazard,  pre- 
mature func t ion ,  l o s s  
of miss ion 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
miss ion 
SOURCE OF 
F A I L U R E  
Loss of mission 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy and mission 
RESOLUTION 
Bad des ign  
Bad des ign 
Lack of under- 
s tanding 
Redesigned and incorporated X 




Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
Redesigned, r e q u a l i f i e d  
Redesigned, r e q u a l i f i e d  
Redesigned,  r e q u a l i f i e d  
XXXXXXXX FLIGHT FAILURE 
TABLE V 
NASA/AIR FORCE AEROSPACE PYROTECHNIC FAILURES 
SPACECRAFT SEPARATION JOINTS AND LINEAR EXPLOSIVES 
DATE PROJECT 
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE FAILURE RESOLUTION PIPACT 
S h u t t l e /  
Centaur 
Centaur 
Separa t ion  j o i n t  
f a i l e d  t o  s e p a r a t e  i n  
cold-temperature deve- 
lopment ( p l a t e s  t o  
be f r a c t u r e d  too t h i c k  
and too s o f t )  
I 
XW(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Severance charge for-  
ward s e a l  f a i l e d  t o  







P o t e n t i a l  de lay  of 
miss ion ,  l o s s  of 
miss ion,  l o s s  of 
S h u t t l e  
Centaur 
Lack of under- 
s tanding 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
miss ion  
Bad des ign  and 
procedures  
proper  assembly) I I 
I Separa t ion  j o i n t  
f a i l e d  margin t e s t s  
w i t h  reduced exp los ive  
load  i n  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
miss ion 
Lack of under- 
s tanding 
Revised q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
on p l a t e s ,  inc reased  
e x p l o s i v e  load 
~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~X~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Improved q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
and t o o l i n g  
Redesigned, inc reased  
exp los ive  load 
Manufacturer ' s  
bad procedures 
i n  tank assembly 
I A t l a s  Centaur AC62  
f a i l e d  i n  f l i g h t  a t  
t ime of s t a g i n g  (se- 
p a r a t i o n  charge con- 
t r i b u t e d  t o  e x i s t i n g  
oxygen l e a k )  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Improved manufacturer ' s  X 






Loss of miss ion 
XXXXXXXX FLIGHT FAILURE 
NASA/AIR FORCE AEROSPACE PYROTECENIC FAILURES 
SPACECRAFT SEPARATION JOINTS AND LINEAR EXPLOSIVES (CONTINUED) 
DATE / PROJECT 
W 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXx 







FAILURE I IMPACT 
Cen tau r  
S h u t t l e  
Severance  cha rge  f o r -  
ward s e a l  f a i l e d  t o  
i n i t i a t e  i n  LAT ( s o l -  
v e n t  contaminat ion)  
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
mi s s ion  
E x t e r n a l  t ank  d e s t r u c t  
c h a r g e  f a i l e d  t o  
a c h i e v e  p e n e t r a t i o n  
i n  LAT 
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE 
P o t e n t i a l  i n a b i l i t y  t o  
d e s t r u c t  t a n k  
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
I RESOLUTION 
F l i g h t  f a i l u r e  of 
T r i d e n t  missile separ-  
t i o n  j o i n t  
Manufac turer  s 
bad  p rocedures  
Loss of  m i s s i o n s  
M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  
b a d  p rocedures  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxxxxxxx 
Improved q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
Re jec t ed  l o t  
X X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
Lack o f  under- 
s t a n d i n g  
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x x ~ ~ ~ ~ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  
M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  
b a d  p r o c e d u r e s  






Severance  cha rge  f o r -  
ward seal f a i l e d  LAT 
( s h e a t h  p o r o s i t y )  
Improved q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxxxxxxxxx 
I 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
m i s s i o n  
XXXXXXXX FLIGHT FAILURE 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x ~ x ~ ~ ~ ~ X X X ~ x ~ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  
T r i d e n t   light f a i l u r e  of 
T r i d e n t  missile separ-  
t i o n  j o i n t  
Loss of m i s s i o n s  Lack of  under-  
s t a n d i n g  
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SPACECRAFT SEPARATIOS JOIYTS Ah3 LIATAR EXPLOSIVES (CONTIEC'UED) 
Docking r i n g  f a i l e d  t o  
s e p a r a t e  i n  Skylab  





Delayed f l i g h t ;  poten- 
t i a l  l o s s  of redun- 
d a n t  system 
P o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of re- 
dundancy, l o s s  of 
mi s s ion  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Apol lo  
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE I RESOLLTION 
Apol lo-Service  Module/ 
Lunar Hodule a d a p t o r  
s e v e r a n c e  cha rge  
f a i l e d  t o  f u n c t i o n  i n  
LAT (RTV s o l v e n t  
a t t a c k e d  co rd )  
Bad d e s i g n  
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g ,  manu- 
f a c t u r e r ' s  bad 
p rocedures  
Redesigned,  r e q u a l i f i e d  
Improved q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
L i n e a r  shaped cha rge  
f a i l e d  t o  i n i t i a t e  i n  
s e r v i c e  l i f e  eva lua-  
ATHENA 
t i o n  
XXXXXXXX FLIGHT FAILURE 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~XXXXXXXXXXXXmXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
L i n e a r  shaped cha rge  
f a i l e d  t o  s e v e r  nose 
cone (damage caused  by 
f i r s t  d e t o n a t o r  t o  
f i r e )  
Loss  of mi s s ion  Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  















S h u t t l e  
A i r c r a f t  
Crash T e s t  
FAILURE 
L igh tn ing  s t r i k e  a t  
launch s i t e  i g n i t e d  3 
of 4 r o c k e t s  readied  
f o r  launch ( E l e c t r o -  
magnetic  induced 
energy  i n  p a r t i a l l y  
s h i e l d e d  and grounded 
f i r i n g  l e a d s )  
P y r o t e c h n i c  I n i t i a t o r  
C o n t r o l l e r  (PIC) c i r -  
c u i t  board r e s i s t o r s  
f a i l i n g  (Outer  s e a l  
t h e r m a l l y  c r a c k i n g ,  
a l l o w i n g  s o l v e n t s  t o  
a t  t a c k  i n t e r n a l  ele- 
ment ) 
A i r c r a f t  c r a s h  t e s t  
program d i scove red  
s t r a y  v o l t a g e  i n  
f a c i l i t y  f i r i n g  c i r -  
c u i t s  i n  f l i g h t  check- 
o u t  (poor  grounding 
and c o r r o s i o n  of 
c a b l e s / c o n n e c t o r s )  
IMPACT 
Loss of mi s s ion  
U n i t s  be ing  r e b u i l t .  
Delay of experiment  
and p o t e n t i a l  l o s s  of 
l i f e  and l o s s  of ex- 
per iment  
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE 
Bad d e s i g n  
Bad d e s i g n  
Bad system t e s t  
p rocedures  
RESOLUTION 
Complete f i r i n g  c i r c u i t  
s h i e l d i n g ,  enhance 
l i g h t n i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  
Rep lace  a l l  r e s i s t o r s  
R e b u i l t  c h e c k o u t / f i r i n g  
c a b l e s  and c o n s o l e s  
U B L E  VI 
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F I R I K G  CIRCUITS (CONTISUED) 
DATE 
I I 
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1 D e s t r u c t  s a f e l a r rn  
f a i l e d  t o  arm on 
l a u n c h  pad ( i n c o r r e c t  
i n t e r f a c e  t o l e r a n c e s  
m e c h a n i c a l l y  pre-  







Delay of f l i g h t  
FAILURE 
X X X X X ~ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X x x X X ~ X x x K x x M w ~ ~ x ~ x x x ~ x X X x x ~ x X X m x X X X X X X x X X X x x X X x x x X X x X X x  
I I I I I 
S h u t t l e  
Bad d e s i g n  
X 
X X X K X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X X m X X X X X X X X X X ~ ~ X X X M X ~ X X ~ X X X X ~ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X X x  
I I I 1 I 
S h u t t l e  
Redes ign  
MPACT 
SRB d e c e l e r a t o r  para-  
c h u t e  r e l e a s e d  pre- 
m a t u r e l y  i n  f l i g h t  a t  
F r u s t r u m  s e p a r a t i o n  
( p y r o t e c h n i c  shock 
a c t i v a t i o n  of wa te r  
impact  s e n s o r )  
XXXXXXXX FLIGHT FAILURE 
SRB n o z z l e  f a i l e d  t o  
s e v e r  i n  f l i g h t  
(damaged e l e c t r i c a l  
c a b l e )  
SOURCE OF 
F A 1  LURE 
Loss of s p e n t  SRB's 
RESOLUTION 
I n c r e a s e d  damage t o  Bad d e s i g n  
SRB c a s e  a t  wa te r  
impact  
I 
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
Redes igned  X 
X 
X 
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Shroud s e p a r a t i o n  
j o i n t  f i r e d  primary 
and secondary charges  
s imul taneously  i n  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  and rup- 
tu red  containment 
(connectors  on f i r i n g  
c i r c u i t s  swapped) 
Lanyard-actuated s a f e  
and arm f a i l e d  q u a l i -  
f i c a t i o n  ( i n a b i l i t y  of 
dev ice  t o  func t ion  
under launch accelera-  
t i o n )  
MPACT 
Damaged t e s t  hardware, 
p o t e n t i a l  damage t o  
s p a c e c r a f t  and f l i g h t  
v e h i c l e  
Modified launch pro- 
cedure  t o  arm on pad 
SOURCE OF 
FAILURE 
Bad des ign  
Lack of under- 
s t a n d i n g  
RESOLUTION 
Redesigned, d i f f e r e n t  
connec to r s  
Unresolved f a i l u r e  
Average - 3.65 / T 
F i g u r e  1.- Frequency o f  py ro techn ic  f a i l u r e s .  




Figure  2.- Frequency of pyrotechnic  f a i l u r e s  i n  f u n c t i o n a l  c a t e g o r i e s .  











Poor Quality Control Procedure 
Figure 4 . -  Frequency of pyrotechnic fa i lure  occurring by cause. 
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